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P71 ABSTRACT 
A digital camera equipped with a processor for authentica- 
tion of images produced from an image file taken by the 
digital camera is provided. The digital camera processor has 
embedded therein a private key unique to it, and the camera 
housing has a public key that is so uniquely related to the 
private key that digital data encrypted with the private key 
may be decrypted using the public key. The digital camera 
processor comprises means for calculating a hash of the 
image file using a predetermined algorithm, and second 
means for encrypting the image hash with the private key, 
thereby producing a digital signature. The image file and the 
digital signature are stored in suitable recording means so 
they will be available together. Apparatus for authenticating 
the image file as being free of any alteration uses the public 
key for decrypting the digital signature, thereby deriving a 
secure image hash identical to the image hash produced by 
the digital camera and used to produce the digital signature. 
The authenticating apparatus calculates from the image file 
an image hash using the same algorithm as before. By 
comparing this last image hash with the secure image hash, 
authenticity of the image file is determined if they match. 
Other techniques to address time-honored methods of decep- 
tion, such as attaching false captions or inducing forced 
perspectives, are included. 
9 Claims, 3 Drawing Sheets 
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DIGITAL CAMERA WITH APPARATUS FOR 
AUTHENTICATION OF IMAGES PRODUCED 
FROM AN IMAGE FILE 
ORIGIN OF INVENTION 
The invention described herein was made in the perfor- 
mance of work under a NASA contract, and is subject to the 
provisions of Public Law 96-517 (35 USC 202) in which the 
contractor has elected not to retain title. 
This application is a continuation-in-part of application 
Ser. No. 08/159,980, filed Nov. 24, 1993, now abandoned. 
TECHNICAL FIELD 
The invention relates to the field of photography, and 
more particularly to a digital camera equipped with appa- 
ratus for enabling an image file produced by the camera to 
be authenticated. 
BACKGROUND ART 
Photographs have in general been regarded as mediums 
that “do not lie.” However, the inherent trustworthiness of 
photographs have been compromised by the increasing 
sophistication and ease with which photographic images can 
be manipulated. This problem is particularly severe in the 
case of digital cameras which store a recorded image in 
digital memory, such as. on magnetic tape or laser disc 
instead of photographic film. There the concept of an 
“original” image is no longer meaningful. 
While a need for authenticating photographs exists today, 
the seriousness of the problem is not yet widely acknowl- 
edged. Consider, for example, that while a photograph can 
be readily altered to a limited extent, it can be authenticated 
only to some degree by comparing a positive print with its 
negative film recorded by a camera while inspecting the 
negative film for evidence of physical alteration. Authenti- 
cation of an image recorded by a digital camera is more 
difficult because there is no physical “original” to compare 
or negative to examine; furthermore, the digital image file 
produced by these cameras (as well as other digitally 
recorded information such as audio and video files) can be 
easily manipulated using sophisticated computers which 
make such manipulation easy and, as techniques improve, 
more difficult to detect. 
Today, most pictures that appear in newspapers and 
magazines have been altered to some degree, with the 
severity varying from the trivial (such as deliberately remov- 
2 
2, pp. 120-126, February, 19781 
Older encryptioddecryption schemes require that both 
the Sender and receiver possess the same secret “key”: the 
sender uses the key to transform the text message into 
5 ciphertext, and the receiver uses the same key to perform an 
inverse transformation on the ciphertext, revealing the origi- 
nal text message. If the correct key transforms the ciphertext 
into unreadable garbage, it is reasonable to conclude that 
either the wrong key is being used, the message has been 
io  altered, or the sender has been impersonated by someone 
ignorant of the fact that a key is required to encrypt so the 
receiver can decipher. The historic drawback to this secret 
key encryption scheme has been in the secure distribution of 
keys; disclosure of the key by the sender to the receiver must 
1s occur out-of-band, either transmitted via an expensive alter- 
nate path or at some prior time, such as when the sender and 
the receiver were in the same space at the same time. 
Public-key encryption techniques differ in that they 
enable the recipient of a message to decrypt it using a public 
20 key that is different from the one used by the sender to 
encrypt it, but mathematically related to it. Public key 
encryption employs two different keys: a private key, which 
is held by the security conscious party sending the message, 
and a corresponding public key, which need not be kept 
25 secret. The public key is generated based upon the private 
key, making the pair unique to each other. 
All public-key cryptography is based on the principle that 
it is easy to multiply two large prime numbers together, but 
extremely difficult (taking perhaps centuries using today’s 
30 supercomputers) to work backwards and uncover the factors 
(public and private keys) that could have been used to 
generate the resulting product of the multiplication process. 
The public-key scheme is illustrated in FIG. 1 and works 
35 as follows: to send a secret message that only the recipient 
can read, the recipient’s public key would first be made 
known to the sender via any nonsecure medium, such as a 
letter, a telephone conversation, or a newspaper notice. 
Anyone wishing to send a secure message would encrypt the 
4o message using this public key and transmit it to the recipient. 
The recipient, having sole possession of the corresponding 
private key, is the only one able to decrypt the message. The 
need to transmit a secret key that both parties must possess 
beforehand is thus obviated. The tradeoff is that, although 
only the recipient can decrypt the message, anyone who 
intercepts the public key can send a message with anonym- 
ity. 
The process described above can also be implemented 
“backwards” to great advantage. In a second scenario, it is 
45 . 
ing diskacting background while cleaning up “noise”) to the the sender who iaintainS pos~ession of the private key, and 
point of deliberate deception, such as substituting heads on 50 anyone who has the widely disseminated conresponding 
image-altering computers continues to increase, the notion private key. Although this no longer the 
that photographs “do not lie” will become less widely held. traditional function of encryption (which is to provide 
55 confidential communication between two parties), it does 
Drovide a way to insure that messages are not forged: only BACKGROUND ON DIGITAL SIGNATURES 
bodies. As the Power, and Of public key is able to decrypt the message encrypted using the 
The concept of a digital “signature” is based upon recent 
encryption techniques called “public key encryption.” 
[Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman, “New Directions in 
Cryptography, “ EEE Transactions on Information Theory, 60 
Vol. IT-22, No. 6, pp. 644654, November, 1976; Taher 
Elgamal, “A Subexponential-Time Algorithm for Computing 
Discrete Logarithms over GF(p2),” IEEE Transactions on 
Information Theory, Vol. IT-31, No. 4, pp. 473-481, July 
1985; and R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir and L. Adleman, “A 65 
Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key 
Cryptosystems, ” Communications of the ACM, Vol. 21, No. 
the private i e y  could have produced a message that is 
decipherable by anyone having the corresponding public 
key. 
The foregoing provides the foundation for the concept of 
digital signatures; encoding a smaller representation of the 
message to verify the integrity and source of the message, as 
will now be described with reference to FIG. 2. The sender 
of a message generates a unique digital signature by hashing 
the message using a regular algorithm and encrypting the 
message using a private key. There is a public key corre- 
sponding to the private key to enable decryption of the 
5,499,294 
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hashed message. The digital signature is transmitted along 
with the plain (unhashed and unencrypted) text message so 
that a recipient may decrypt the digital signature and thus 
authenticate the message by comparison of the decrypted 
hash and a hash of the plain text message transmitted with 5 
the signature. Any difference will readily show that the 
message has been altered or has been transmitted by a person 
other than the one possessing the private key, which is itself 
a digital code. Thus, as long as the private key remains 
private, only the private key holder can produce messages 10 
decipherable by anyone holding the public key. Further- 
more, it is extremely difficult to “reverse-engineer” the 
encrypted message using the public key to ascertain the 
private key. Without knowledge of the private key, a digital 
Digital signatures thus build upon the public-key crypto- 
graphic technique and allow a recipient to not only authen- 
ticate the contents of a plain text message but also the 
identity of the sender without obscuring the original mes- 
sage. Digital signatures are produced by creating a hash of 2o 
the original plain text message, and then encrypting the hash 
using the sender’s private key, as shown in the top half of 
FIG. 2. The result is a second, smaller digital file referred to 
as a signature which accompanies the original plain text 
A “hash” is created by a mathematical function which 
maps values from a large domain into a smaller range. For 
example, a checksum is a simple kind of hash. A more 
complex example of a hash algorithm would involve divid- 
ing a binary file into a collection of, say, 16 kilobit pieces 30 
and performing a cumulative exclusive-OR function 
between successive pieces. That produces a simple 16 
kilobit hash which is smaller than the original file yet is 
particularly unique to it. Many more complex and secure 
transformations are also possible. An advantageous charac- 35 
teristic of a hash is that changing a single bit in the original 
message input would produce a very different hash output if 
subjected to the same mathematical function. This advan- 
tage of a hash will become apparent in the use of a hash in 
the present invention. Another advantage is that reverse 
engineering a message so it will yield a given hash and also 
make sense to the reader is virtually impossible. Thus, a key 
to the present invention is that a unique encrypted digital 
signature can be created by encrypting the output of the 
hashing function using a sender’s private key. 
In the process of hashing a message to produce a digital 
signature, the original message is retained unaltered; only 
the message’s hash is altered by encryption with a private 
key. This way the original file can be read by anyone, yet 5o 
each recipient may authenticate the message by decrypting 
the message’s unique digital signature using the public key. 
If the decrypted digital signature and hash of the message in 
question is created by the same mathematical function that 
matches, both the integrity of the message and the authen- 55 
ticity of the sender are assured. 
“signature” cannot be forged. 15 
message as a separate block of data. 25 
40 
45 
DIGITAL CAMERAS 
Standard digital cameras are filmless; they sense light and 60 
color via an electronic device, such as a charge coupled 
device commonly known as a CCD, and produce as an 
output a computer file which describes the image using data 
bits (1’s and 0’s) arranged in a meaningful, predefined 
format. Often this digital image file is first stored on a small 65 
mass-storage medium inside the camera itself, such as a 
magnetic floppy disc, or a magneto-optical disk commonly 
4 
referred to as a compact disc (CD), for later transference to 
a digital system for image processing and/or display. Alter- 
natively, the image file can be sent directly to a digital 
system via a transmission medium. Once inside the digital 
system, it then can be displayed and easily altered in any 
number of different ways. 
There are several ways of lying with an image, some as 
old as photography itself. The primary methods are: attach- 
ing false captions to the published photograph, using false 
perspectives and distortions of a scene, and manipulating the 
appearance of objects or persons in the scene, such as by 
computer-assisted manipulation of pixels while the image is 
still stored in digital form. The present invention addresses 
techniques for thwarting attempts to lie with photographs 
using one or more of these ways of lying. 
STATEMENT OF THE INVENTION 
An object of the invention is to provide a solution to the 
problem of authenticating digital image files, where the 
image file may be, for example, a single still image from a 
digital camera, a sequence of images from a digital video 
camera or even digital holograms. Authentication in this 
sense means to establish as worthy of belief that the image 
file has not been altered after its digital signature has been 
created. The term “image file” is thus used herein to refer to 
the recorded file of a digital still camera, a digital video 
camera or a digital holographic camera. 
In accordance with one aspect of the invention, a digital 
camera system is equipped with not only the means for 
providing an image file (either stored in an internal medium 
for later transmission or transmitted directly to a digital 
image processing system) but also means for first providing 
a hash of the image file or blocks of the file in the case of 
a very long image file, such as from a video camera and 
means for then encrypting the hash with a unique private key 
embedded in the digital camera system. The private key is 
not known by anyone except perhaps the manufacturer of 
the digital camera system, or the encrypting means imple- 
mented, for example, as a programmed microprocessor 
embedded in the digital camera system. All that the user 
need know is a public key unique to the digital camera 
system. The encrypted hash is stored as a digital signature 
along with the image file and public key for later authenti- 
cation. 
For authentication of the image file, means for hashing the 
image file in question produces a checking hash, and means 
for decrypting the digital signature using the public key 
reveals the true hash produced by the digital camera system 
from the true, plain text image file and means for comparing 
the checking hash with the true hash. If the two hashes 
match, it is certain that the image file is authentic, i.e., that 
the image file has not been altered. 
To further enhance the authenticatableness of an image 
from a digital camera system, information is added in a 
border of the digital camera image frame, such as the public 
key which is a unique serial number identifying the camera, 
the date, time, light level, color temperature, f/stop, shutter 
speed, latitude and longitude of the camera position, the 
camera pointing direction, focusing distance of the camera 
lens system and range (distance) from the camera of promi- 
nent objects in the image. All of the added information that 
is recorded in the border of the image frame is hashed and 
encrypted together with the image to become part of the 
signature. That information cannot be altered in the original 
image file containing this information without it being 
5,499,294 
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detected by later comparing the original image file hash with both are required to authenticate the image file. 
secure image hash of the original image file obtained from Once the digital image file and the digital signature are 
the digital signature by decrypting the digital signature with generated and stored on a medium in the camera system 
apublic key that is mathematically related to the private key. and/or transferred into a digital processor memory for pro- 
Any alteration of the original image file transmitted with the 5 cessing, the image file’s authenticity can be checked at any 
digital signature, including the information entered on the time thereafter by a decrypting authentication system 20 
border of an image file, will result in a mismatch of the two shown in FIG. 3c using a public key taken from the Camera 
hashes compared. Only if there is not a mismatch will the r m ~ ~  Plate O r the image’s border. The Public key Can be 
original image file be declared authentic, and as an freely distributed to users for authentication of image files 
tional benefit the ofthe image file will be declared as using the authentication system 20. This authentication 
“authentic7, since a having the private key system 20 has neither the public nor the private key stored. 
mathematically related to the public key can produce and It requires as inputs the digital image file in question, its 
which is unique to the camera believed to have originated image file hash. the image and digital signature files. It is perfectly reason- 
image scene provides authenticatable data about the scene to appearing on the is used by the 
an investigator which helps in the identification of incon- manufacturer to identify the camera for such purposes as 
sistencies in the image as well as in any image caption added warranty repair or replacement. ne public key is math- 
prevent use of an altered image that is projected at lifesize 20 microprocessor 12b of the digital camera 10 to 
camera system at a distance similar to that image’s content 
send a digital signature that contains a matching hash of the accompanYing digital and the Public key 
The range Of prominent Objects in the digital l5 able to use as the public key the camera’s serial number 
name plate 
to a published photograph Or video scene. It ematically related to the private key embedded in the secure 
proportions and then photographed again with the Original declypting the digital signature with the public key in the 
and private keys. For image authentication, the image file is 
hashed for comparison, with the secure image hash obtained 
conventional way of encryption and decryption using public 
would suggest for then 
be recorded as being at 
Objects in the photograph would 
the Same range since 
points in the projected image would be virtually the same as 25 by decrypting the digital 
at the center of the projected image 
that was encrypted with 
a private key using the public key. If there are no bit 
mismatches between the secure image hash and the image 
hash of the image file, authenticity is confirmed, as will now 
be described in more detail. 
The authentication system 20 calculates its own image file tion. 
hash using a hash calculator 21 comprising a digital pro- 
rithm used in the digital camera (which need not be kept a producing and using a digital signature. 
FIG. 3a illustrates a Preferred application of the Present 35 secret) and a secure image hash using a decryptor 22 
invention to digital cameras. comprising a digital processing system with the public key 
FIG. 3b is a block diagram of the present invention as as a second input to decrypt the digital signature. That then 
applied to digital cameras for producing a file image with a reveals the hash originally calculated by the digital camera 
digital signature to allow authentication of the file image by processor 12 at the time the image was taken. Note that both 
the recipient. 40 the hash calculator 21 and the decryptor 22 may be imple- 
FIG. 3c is a block diagram of a system for authenticating mented in the same digital processing system 20. A com- 
the file image from the digital camera of FIG. 3a. parator 23 receives the image hash from the hash calculator 
two hashes match, it is certain to any required degree that the digital camera. 
45 digital image in question is indeed identical to what the 
digital camera system 10 originally produced. If, on the 
other hand, even one single bit in the image being authen- 
ticated has been altered, the two hashes will not even closely 
applied to digital cameras, the object is to provide a match and the image’s authenticity Will be indigated as not 
digital signature for an image file as it emerges in digital 50 being aErmed by an authenticity output signal A; otherwise 
form from a digital camera system 10 for later authentication the comparator will indicate authenticity by an output signal 
as required. To accomplish this, the digital camera 11 A. 
produces from a contained processor 12 two output files for If the technique is to be effective (i.e., no false positives 
each captured image as shown in FIG. 3a: the first is an all or false negatives) and extended to larger data sets such as 
digital, industry standard format image file representing the 55 digital video, or even digital holograms, reliance must be 
captured image. The second would be an encrypted digital made upon the digital memory file systems of the computer 
signature of the image file produced as shown in FIG. 3b by mass storage industry, which has already achieved the ability 
using the camera’s unique private key (embedded within the to store and deliver extremely large binary data sets without 
digital camera’s secure microprocessor 12b) to encrypt a errors. On the other hand, analog techniques such as the 
hash of the captured image file (produced by hashing 60 NTSC encoding on video tape formats are not sufficiently 
microprocessor 12a) for creating an encrypted image hash, reliable for the present invention. Noncorrected digital for- 
thus producing a digital signature which, like the image file, mats, such as the popular compact disc (CD), are also not 
is recorded in a recorder 12c of the digital camera system 10, sufficiently reliable. In fact CD recording is so unreliable 
or transmitted directly to a digital processor’s memory for that CD player manufacturers now utilize special tech- 
later authenticating and viewing the captured image. It is the 65 niques, such as “oversampling” to combat the problem of 
responsibility of the user to keep track of the image and missed bits. Such techniques introduce a large number of 
digital signature files once they leave the camera 10 since errors upon playback which are normally imperceptible and 
BRTEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating public key encryp- 30 
FIG‘ is a diagram ’lustrating the method of cessing system programmed with the same hashing algo- 
FIG. 4 illustrates a colored border of an image from a 21 and the Secure image hash from the decryptor 22. If 
DETALED DESCRIPTION OF THE 
INVENTION 
7 
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therefore unsuitable for the purposes of image authentication 
in accordance with this invention. Consequently, the present 
invention is directed to extremely reliable digital recording 
systems of all kinds. 
Measures of Protection 
The invention as described above is resistant to forgery 
attempts since the private key (which is not known to 
anybody except the manufacturer of the camera) is embed- 
ded in a probe-proof microprocessor which itself is deeply 
integrated into the camera’s digital system. Even if some 
adept person were to disassemble the camera and replace the 
microprocessor chip with one containing a different key, the 
digital signature produced thereafter would not be decrypt- 
able by any public key published by the manufacturer since 
the private key must be mathematically related to the public 
key in the conventional way of public key cryptography, and 
the only private key that is properly related to the public key 
could not feasibly be derived from the public key. 
The advantages of freely distributing the verification 
algorithm and valid public keys are great; with the algorithm 
freely available, verification can become commonplace and 
routine. No special certification authority need be involved 
in routine authenticity checks and no angst among the 
parties involved need be created as a result of image file 
authenticity being challenged. But the mass distribution of 
the verification algorithm does carry one danger: it would be 
possible for someone to create a bogus program which 
looks, behaves, and has the same file length as the genuine 
verification algorithm with the only difference being it 
always proclaims a “hash match” regardless of the authen- 
ticity of the image being verified. With the algorithm freely 
and Widely available, this is not a large risk as additional 
copies of the verification algorithm can be easily obtained 
from multiple sources and a more reliable authenticity check 
made using a best two-out-of-three scheme. Alternatively, as 
a precaution, a digital signature and an image file known to 
have an altered image may be used to authenticate the 
algorithm of the authenticator to be used to determine 
whether or not it has been created to always proclaim a 
“hash match.” When the stakes are high and it is extremely 
important that the authentication algorithm be known to be 
genuine, an independent certification authority or the manu- 
facturer of the digital camera could be called upon to provide 
a copy of their own algorithm and the public key from their 
list of public keys (camera serial numbers) at the time of 
authentication. 
The algorithm and private key necessary for encrypting 
the digital signature file from within the digital camera are 
to be embedded inside a new class of secure microproces- 
sors whose ROM contents cannot be read once the recording 
system leaves the factory. Because the private key used for 
encryption is hard-coded into the microprocessor chip by the 
manufacturer (who must then ensure the private key remains 
secret), credibility of the recording system’s output becomes 
an extension of that of the manufacturer; the digital signa- 
ture from the digital camera can be considered to be just as 
reliable and secure as if the signature had been generated by 
the manufacturer. 
Each digital camera should possess its own unique pair of hashed and encrypted and a third block of data is recorded 
private and public keys, with the private key etched into the in a third buffer at a faster clock rate so that its algorithms 
system’s secure microprocessor and the public key stored in 60 are complete in the second buffer in time to transfer the 
three places: in a public key list kept by the manufacturer, on digital signature in a third buffer to a camera bulk storage 
the digital camera’s name plate itself (which can then also medium before a multiplexer shifts functions among the set 
double as the camera’s serial number), and in a border as of three buffers for the next block of data. Thus, with a set 
shown in FIG. 4 which contains more data about the of three buffers A, B and C, assume A is receiving an image 
captured image as will be discussed in more detail below. 65 block, B is hashing and encrypting a previous block, and C 
Assigning unique keys to each camera has the benefit of is transfemng an encrypted block into the camera bulk 
avoiding instant obsolescence which would occur if only storage medium. During the next block interval, the func- 
one private key were used for all cameras, and that key were 
to be compromised. An even higher level of security would 
occur if the manufacturer were to destroy all records of each 
private key as the cameras are manufactured, since at that 
point the private key is no longer needed by the manufac- 
turer; only the record of public keys are retained, which 
could be the same as the assigned serial number as noted 
above. This would eliminate the possibility of private keys 
being compromised by industrial espionage or theft. 
Finally, regular and free distribution of all valid public 
keys is desirable to defeat a counterfeiter who has learned of 
the encryption algorithm employed and has written a pro- 
gram to produce digital signatures based on fictitious private 
key. Decoding these digital signatures would require the use 
15 of a public key not generated by the manufacturer and thus 
expose them as forgeries at the outset. Freely distributing 
updated public key lists would make it easy to identify and 
thwart such attempts. In fact, it is recommended that the 
public key of the camera be recorded on the border of the 
20 image file for use as the public key in the decryptor 22 since 
alteration of that public key in the image file to be authen- 
ticated would result in the declaration by the comparator 23 
of a mismatch between the secure image hash from the 
decryptor 22 and the hash of the image file from the hash 
Uses of the Invention 
The single most obvious use of the present invention in 
digital cameras would be in situations where proof of image 
authenticity is necessary; such as for legal evidence, insur- 
30 ance claims, or intelligence gathering. The inevitable tran- 
sition to digital cameras and electronically-transmitted 
images will also make it more difficult for the photographer 
to protect his image copyright, since electronic images tend 
to proliferate faster and with less control from the author 
35 than the traditional distribution method which places image 
control in the hands of whoever holds the original negative 
or transparency. Just as it is common practice today to obtain 
releases from photographed persons for any published pic- 
ture containing a recognizable image of the person, it is 
40 reasonable that in the future no electronic image will be 
published without first having authenticated the image using 
the digital signature of the camera which is registered with 
the photographer in order to thwart claims that photographs 
published have been altered and to improve the trustwor- 
45 thiness of all publications and to uphold copyright claims. 
This technique need not be limited to still digital images. 
Because digital signatures can be used to verify any block of 
digital data in an image file, it can also be implemented in 
digital video cameras as noted hereinbefore. In all of these 
50 devices, a digital signature can be generated and recorded 
each time the recording process stops or pauses, or after each 
block of data; each video “take” is hashed, encoded and 
written at the time it is recorded, or in the case of continuous 
recording by a digital, video recorder at the time each block 
55 is completed by using the technique of multiplexing between 
a set of three sets of buffers; as one buffer is filled with a 
block of data. another block of data in a second buffer is 
5 
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tions are switched A to B, B to C and C to A, and during the 
third block interval the functions are again switched B to C, 
C to A, and A to B. The following block interval commences 
a new multiplexing cycle. In that manner, real-time record- 
ing in the camera bulk storage medium is delayed by only 5 
three block intervals. 
A Special Border 
In the case of the digital camera equipped with the present 
invention being targeted towards legal authentication, a few 
additional features can be implemented to better serve this 10 
use. A brightly colored border could automatically be gen- 
erated as part of each captured image file. Within the border 
would appear (as shown in FIG. 4) textual information about 
the image: the camera public key, the date and time it was 
taken, the ambient light level seen by the camera at the time 15 
of exposure, the original color temperature of the scene, the 
software version of the camera’s firmware, f/stop and shutter 
speed (or the CCD equivalent “sample time”), the focusing 
distance of the lens at the time of exposure, the distance 
(range) of prominent objects in the scene being imaged 20 
using a range finder 13, such as an acoustic, infrared or laser 
range finder or other range finders such as multiple-object 
optical range finding or contrast detection range finding 
systems, a unique image sequence number and, when the 
technology allows for a Global Positioning System (GPS) 25 
receiver to be built into the camera, the geographical coor- 
dinates of the camera indicating where in the world the 
picture was taken. 
The present invention as it applies to authentication of 
camera photographs as described with reference to FIGS. 30 
3u, 3b, 3c and 4 completely mitigates the new threats of 
computer-assisted alteration of digital image files and elimi- 
nates the threat of deception by attaching or substituting 
false captions or other information recorded in the border as 
shown in FIG. 4. Such information helps an investigator 35 
identify and interpret information by what is depicted in the 
photographs. 
One piece of information captured in the border of the 
photographs is arecord of the distance at which the lens was 
focused. A second piece of information captured in the 40 
border that may be useful in interpretation of the photograph 
in a more sophisticated way is range information of promi- 
nent objects in the scene at the time the picture was taken 
using the range finder 13, such as an acoustic range finder, 
or an infrared or laser range finder. Optical range finders 45 
could also be used. In an acoustic range finder, the acoustic 
module (sometimes referred to as an “ultrasonic transducer” 
operates at frequencies selected beyond the range of human 
hearing, and often pulses of multiple frequencies may be 
used to guard against the absorption of a single frequency by 50 
a particular object. Once the timing of the return echo has 
been obtained, the distance can be determined by employing 
the formula d=(1,100 t)2 where the distance of the object d 
is in feet and the t is the number of seconds. For example, 
if the echo returns in 9 milliseconds, the distance of an object 55 
would be recorded as 5 feet. Listening for multiple echoes 
could allow for recording the distance of several prominent 
objects in the field of view (typically at least three). Less 
prominent objects could return echoes of lesser energy, but 
prominent objects should be selected by adjustment of a 60 
threshold selection amplifier. Range information recorded in 
the image border not only makes digital manipulation of the 
photograph in a computer more difficult without the manipu- 
lated photograph being declared not authentic by the com- 
parator 23, but also aids one viewing and analyzing the 65 
scene with some perspective of the two-dimensional pho- 
tograph of a three-dimensional scene, such that the depths of 
294 
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all other objects may be estimated by the relative positions 
of the prominent objects the range of which are determined 
and recorded. 
The range information also thwarts attempts to make a 
duplicate “original” image file which has been manipulated 
by projecting at lifesize proportions the manipulated image 
file and photographing it with the same camera as was used 
to record the truly original image file at a distance similar to 
what the image’s content would suggest. Such a manipu- 
lated duplicate “original” would be readily declared to be 
not authentic since all ranges recorded for the objects in the 
image would be virtually the same as the range recorded for 
objects at or near the center of the projected image instead 
of the true original ranges recorded in the truly original 
image file. 
The lens’ focused distance and Ustop are there to help 
detect potential abuse of the camera, such as taking a 
close-up picture of a modified photograph and trying to pass 
it off as an unaltered original. The ambient light level and 
color temperature readings would be useful for getting a feel 
for exactly what the scene was like at the time of exposure; 
something a sensitive optical element might inadvertently 
hide via automatic exposure and color correction. 
Since all the textual data in the image file border are part 
of the authenticated image file, their credibility are also 
upheld when authenticated by the authentication process. 
The accuracy of the date and time information would again 
be the responsibility of the secure microprocessor; in addi- 
tion to being able to keep its algorithm and private key a 
secret, it also could have a lithium battery powering a system 
clock set to Universal (Greenwich Mean) Time at the time 
of manufacture. If the timer should ever fail or is tampered 
with, the system would be programmed to fill the time and 
date fields with XXXX’s, eliminating the chance of an 
erroneous random time being indicated for the actual time. 
Higher Level of Security 
Although the present invention offers a satisfactory level 
of security, nevertheless there still exists a small possibility 
that a determined person may be able to discover the 
camera’s private key given an extended amount of time. (No 
cryptographic scheme will protect data forever; given suf- 
ficient time, advancements in code breaking or improved 
computer power may some day be enough to render any 
existing level of cryptographic protection obsolete.) If the 
discovered private key were to be available to the custodian 
of the camera image files, it would allow the custodian of the 
image files from that camera to generate authentic-looking 
digital signatures on altered image files, essentially under- 
mining the credibility offered by the compromised camera. 
However, the security level of other cameras in use, and of 
images taken with those other cameras will remain uncom- 
promised. 
It would be wise for a manufacturer of such digital 
cameras to regularly upgrade and enhance the sophistication 
of the encryption implementation as newer camera models 
are introduced, typically those using longer encryption/ 
decryption key lengths and improved encryptioddecryption 
and hash algorithms. It is expected that evolving authenti- 
cation algorithms (the public domain component of this 
authentication invention which is to be freely distributed) 
will be designed to be compatible with earlier versions, Le., 
to recognize, identify and authenticate image files made with 
all previous digital camera models equipped with a micro- 
processor for hash calculation and a secure microprocessor 
for encryption with a private key. 
Because the encryption details must necessarily be 
changed often (depending on the technological capabilities 
5,499,294 
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of the day), no single image format, key length encryption, 
or hashing algorithm is being specified. Instead, reference is 
gy’s (NIST) proposed Digital Signature Standard (DSS) as 
an example for implementation of the present invention. 5 
[Dennis K. Branstad, “The Proposal for a US. Standard for 
Digital Signature Encoding, ” IEEE Spectrum, pp. 30, 
August 19921 
A specific application of the present invention is directed 
toward the solution Of an ever more troubling social prob- 10 
lem, namely the eroding credibility of photographic images, 
but its many other applications where image files are to be 
stored, transmitted andor transformed to visual form may 
also benefit from it. 
been described and illustrated herein, it is recognized that 
modifications may readily occur to those skilled in the art. 
Consequently, it is intended that the claims be interpreted to 
cover such modifications and equivalents thereof. 
means of said digital camera apparatus by calculating 
image hash of said image file from said digital camera, 
that has been maintained in association with said digital 
signature, said fifth means using said predetermined 
algorithm, and 
sixth means for comparing said image hash of said image 
file calculated by said fifth means with said secure 
image hash from said fourth means to determine 
authenticity of said image file that has been maintained 
in association with said digital signature for use of said 
image file in reproducing an image represented by said 
image file if both said image file and said secure image 
file match identically. 
3. A as defined in claim wherein said 
4. A combination as defined in claim 3 wherein said public 
I claim: 2o key is published. 
1. A digital camera with apparatus for authentication of 5, A combination as defined in claim 4 wherein said public 
images produced from an image file taken by said digital key is Published on said digital camera. 
camera of a scene, said digital camera having embedded 6.  A combination as defined in claim 4 wherein said public 
therein a private key unique to said digital camera and a key is digitally recorded in a border of said image file and 
known public key so uniquely based upon said private key 7.5 is processed through hashing and encryption with said image 
that digital data encrypted with said private key may be file. 
decrypted using said public key, said digital camera appa- 7. A combination as defined in claim 6 wherein further 
ratus comprising information is digitally recorded in said border regarding 
first means for calculating image hash of said image file parameters of said digital camera extant at the time said 
using a predetermined algorithm, 30 image file is taken and is processed through hashing and 
second means for encrypting said image hash with said encryption with said image file to assist in reproduction and 
embedded private key, thereby producing a digital interpretation of a reproduced image of said scene. 
signature uniquely associated with said image file, and 
made to the National Institute Of  Standards and Technolo- fifth for calculating image hash of said image file 
Although particular embodiments of the invention have 15 
private key is embedded in said second means. 
8. A combination as defined in claim 1 wherein focusing 
third means for maintaining association of both said 35 distance is digitally recorded in a border of said image file 
and is processed through hashing and encryption with said image file and said digital signature derived from said 
image file by said first and second means. image file. 
2. A combination as defined in claim 1 including separate 9. A combination as defined in claim 1 wherein range 
apparatus for authenticating at any time said image file as from said digital camera to one or more prominent objects 
being free of any alteration using said associated digital 4o in said scene are recorded in a border of said image file and 
signature, said separate apparatus comprising is processed through hashing and encryption with said image 
file. fourth means for decrypting said digital signature, using 
said public key, thereby deriving a secure image hash 
identical to said image hash produced by said first * * * * *  
